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BROAD STATUTORY LANGUAGE IS NOT
AMBIGUOUS: THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT APPLIES IN STATE PRISONS
I. INTRODUCTION
It is not uncommon for disabled prisoners to allege discrimination in
American prisons today, nor is the number of disabled prisoners few.'
These prisoners allege that they are denied the opportunity to participate
in work release 2 and rehabilitation programs, 3 and that they are denied
access to prison facilities, such as dining halls and libraries. In addition,
disabled prisoners claim they are not being provided with satisfactory
medical attention, hygiene,5 and emergency evacuation plans.
6
When a state prison elects to provide certain services to its prisoners,
it has presumably decided that providing these programs is either neces-
1. Few studies have been conducted to determine the percentage of inmates
with disabillities. See Elaine Gardner, The Legal Rights of Inmates with Physical
Disabilities, 14 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 175, 176 (1994). Furthermore, state
participation in the limited studies conducted has been lacking. See id Thus, it is
difficult to ascertain the percentage of prisoners that are disabled. See id.
2. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Services,
126 F.3d 539, 590-91 (4th Cir. 1997). In Amos, thirteen disabled Maryland State
prisoners alleged they were denied participation in work release and pre-release
programs offered at the prison because of their disabilities. See id. They main-
tained that the denial of access to such. work related programs resulted in longer
prison sentences. See id
3. S'ee Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th
Cir. 1997). A former disabled state prisoner claimed he had been denied access to
educational programs because of his disability. See id See also Armstrong v.
Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1997). In Armstrong, disabled prison in-
mates and parolees filed a class action lawsuit alleging, among other things, that
California state officials working in their official capacities denied inmates access
to vocational programs because of the prisoners' disabilities. The prisoners also
contended that certain prisoners were denied sentence reduction credits due to im-
proper place~ment in educational and work programs. See id.
4. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 590-91; Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1021. The dis-
abled prisoners in Amos also alleged that they were denied equal access to certain
prison facilities, such as the bathrooms, because of their disabilities. See Amos,
126 F.3d at 590-91.
5. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 590-91.
6. S ee Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1021.
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sary, for example, medical assistance, or justified, such as religious and
educational services. It is also likely that the state prison, in justifying a
program, considers the fact that most prisoners are ultimately released,
and that society thereby benefits from the service. Consequently, if a
prison facility denies certain prisoners access to these programs due to
their disabilities, both the prisoner and society may be harmed. Reha-
bilitation of these prisoners is less likely, and therefore, they are more
likely to repeat their crimes once released. In addition, the prisoners are
more dependent on the federal and state governments for support.
As a society, we do not tolerate substandard treatment of individuals
because they are disabled. However, within the confines of a prison,
disabled prisoners generally lack the means to help prevent and remedy
discrimination. Without adequate protection, particularly in light of the
closed nature of prisons, and the often unsympathetic attitude that soci-
ety has toward prisoners, the actions of prison officials may go un-
checked, leading to a greater likelihood of discrimination against dis-
abled prisoners.
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)7 enacted a con-
gressional policy that, as a society, we will not tolerate discrimination
against the disabled. Over the last two years, there has been a debate
among the federal courts regarding whether disabled prisoners should
receive the same protection under the ADA that the statute affords to
other disabled individuals. Five United States Courts of Appeals have
heard this question! Three courts held that the Act does apply; two that
it does not. This issue was recently resolved by the Supreme Court in
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey, 9 in which a unani-
mous court concluded that the ADA covers inmates in state prisons.
The core issue leading to the Supreme Court's ruling in Yeskey was
whether the broad provisions of the ADA unambiguously evidenced
Congress' intent to apply the Act to inmates in state prisons. Because
the administration of state prisons has historically been a power reserved
7. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
8. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 591 (holding that the ADA does not apply to in-
mates in state prisons); Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1023 (holding that the ADA applies
to inmates in state prisons); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d
168, 174 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA applies to inmates in state prisons);
Crawford, 115 F.3d at 486 (holding that the ADA applies to inmates in state pris-
ons); White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADA
does not apply to inmates in state prisons).
9. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
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for the states, 0 the'difference in opinions prior to Yeskey can be ex-
plained by the degree to which a court was concerned about protecting
the balance of power between the federal government and the states.
Due to the differences in opinion as to whether the ADA was ambiguous
in its appIlication to prisoners, the debate centered on whether the clear
statement rule of statutory construction applied.
The clear statement rule is a rule of statutory construction that re-
quires Congress to speak clearly in the text of a statute if it intends to
apply it in a manner that would frustrate the traditional federal-state bal-
ance of pDwer.1 Where any ambiguity in the text exists, a court is to
interpret the statute as preserving state control.12 However, the parame-
ters of the: rule were not clear when the Circuit Courts were interpreting
Title II. This was because the clear statement rule was only used to de-
termine how a statute should be applied in one prior case, Gregory v.
Ashcroft. 3
The issue in Gregory was whether state appointed judges were cov-
ered under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA). 4 The Court determined that the ADEA was ambiguous on the
question of whether state appointed judges fell within one of the excep-
tions in the statute.' 5 Recognizing the federalism concerns implicated by
applying the ADEA to state appointed judges, the Court applied the
clear statement rule and concluded that Congress had not preempted the
states' ability to mandate the qualifications of its judges.' 6 The decision
left two important issues unresolved: First, which state functions trigger
use of the rule; second, how clear must the language be in order to inter-
pret the statute as destroying state control. Both of these issues resur-
faced in the debate over whether the ADA applies to state prisoners. The
lack of guidance regarding the parameters of the clear statement rule led
to the disparity among the ADA/state prisoner decisions of the Circuit
Courts.
10. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) ("It is difficult to
imagine am activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more
intricately !bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the admini-
stration of its prisons.").
11. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460-61 (1991).
12. See id
13. .501 U.S. 452 (1991).
14. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
15. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
16. See id.
1998)
278 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 15:275
In Yeskey, the Supreme Court applied the clear statement rule to the
broad language of the ADA and concluded that the rule is "amply
met." 17 One implication of this decision is disabled prisoners can cur-
rently establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA..
However, this decision also addressed the degree of clarity statutory
language must have to satisfy the demands of the clear statement rule.
According to the Court, broad statutory language in a federal statute 'is
not ambiguous even when applied in a manner that preempts a core state
function. The Court's decision in Yeskey, therefore, affords future courts
with a greater understanding of the scope of the clear statement rule. In
the future, this may ultimately lead to greater consistency among deci-
sions involving congressional intent to preempt a core state function.
This Comment analyzes the issues presented in the debate over
whether the ADA covers state correctional facilities and their prisoners.
More specifically, this Comment discusses Title II, Subtitle A' 8 of the
ADA, which governs state and local government entities. Part II reviews
the general purposes and provisions of the ADA. Part III reviews Title II
of the ADA and its application to state prisoners. Part IV analyzes the
debate among the Circuit Courts leading to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Yeskey. This part will specifically focus on the application of the
clear statement rule. Part V discusses the Yeskey decision and Part VI
discusses the implications of the Supreme Court's ruling.
II. THE ADA
A. Background and Purposes of the Act
President George Bush signed the ADA into law on July 26, 1990. At
that time, Congress estimated that forty-three million Americans were
living with a disability, a figure that was likely to increase as the Ameri-
can population aged.19 Congress also acknowledged that throughout
history many disabled individuals have faced discrimination 20 and that
such discrimination continues to be a "serious and pervasive social
17. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954
(1998).
18. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12134 (1994).
19. Seeid § 12101(a)(1).
20. See id. § 12101(a)(2). Congress states that "historically, society has
tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities ... ." Id
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problem." 21 Specifically, discrimination continues to exist in "employ-
ment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, com-
munication, recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and
access to public services.
22
At the time President Bush signed the ADA into law, legislation at the
state level was inadequate, and the existing federal anti-discrimination
statute relating to disability, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilita-
tion Act), 23 only applied to entities receiving federal funding. 24 There-
fore, not all entities were prohibited from discriminating against indi-
viduals with disabilities. Consequently, there was a need for a compre-
hensive federal statute to ensure the protection of all disabled individu-
als against discrimination. Congress enacted the ADA with this purpose
in mind.2' The statute attempts to remove obstacles facing disabled indi-
viduals in order to ensure that they have equal access to opportunities,
participate fully in society, and enjoy more independent, self-sufficient
lives.26
B. Overview of the Statute
The AI)A prohibits a covered entity from discriminating against a
21. jId.
22. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994).
24. For discussion of the Rehabilitation Act, see infra Part III subsection D.
25. The statute provides a statement of its purpose:
to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards ad-
dresing discrimmation against individuals with disabilities; (3) to
ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforc-
ing the standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals
with disabilities- and (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional
authority including the power to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major ar-
eas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id. § 12101(b).
26. See id § 12101(a)(8). Congress described the goals of the ADA as:
"[T]he Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure
equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals ... ." Id. The ADA focuses on creating equality
for the disabled by removing the artificial barriers that hinder their equality. See
GARY PHELAN & JANET BOND ARTERTON, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION IN THE
WORKPLACE, 11 (1997). Thus, the goal of the ADA is to create a level playing
field, rather than provide the disabled special protection. See id
1998]
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disabled individual on the basis of disability. There are five titles within
the statute. Each title prohibits disability discrimination in specific set-
tings: Title 127 prohibits discrimination in employment;28 Title 1129 pro-
hibits discrimination by-state and local governments in relation to public
services and transportation;3" Title III prohibits discrimination by pri-
vate entities providing public accommodation; 2 Title IV3" prohibits dis-
crimination by telecommunications providers and common carriers; 34
and Title V35 contains general requirements.
36
27. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
28. See id. § 12112. The prohibition against discrimination in Title I is:
"No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability
because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures,
the ,hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." Id The title
defines a "covered entity" as "an employer, employment agency, labor organiza-
tion, or joint labor-management committee." Id. § 12111(2). An "employer" is
defined as follows:
[A] person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has 15
or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any
agency of such person except that, for two years following the ef-
fective date of this tite, an employer means a person engaged in
an industry affecting commerce who has 25 or more employees for
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the cur-
rent or preceding year, and any agent such person.
Id. An "employee" is "an individual employed by an employer." Id §
12111(4).
29. See id. §§ 12131-12134, 12141-12150, 12161-12165. Title II is divided
into two subtitles, A and B. Subtitle A covers public services. Id §§ 12131-34.
Subtitle B covers public transportation. Id. §§ 12141-50, 12161-65. Any mention
of Title II in the remainder of this Comment refers to subtitle A only.
30. See infra Part III, subsections A and B for an in-depth analysis of the
provisions of Title II.
31. See42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189.
32. See id. § 12182(a). The prohibition is that "[n]o individual shall be dis-
criminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place
of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or oper-
ates a place of public accommodation." Id. The definition of a "public accommo-
dation" is found at 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7).
33. See47 U.S.C. §§ 225, 711 (1995).
34. See id.
35. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213.
36. Title V abrogates the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id
§ 12202. The title also contains an anti-retaliation clause and a prohibition against
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An individual alleging a violation of the ADA must prove that he or
she has a disability under the statute and was discriminated against on
the basis of the disability.37 Furthermore, an individual bringing suit
under Titles I or II of the ADA must demonstrate that he or she is a
"qualified individual. 3 There is no such requirement under Title Ill.39
A covered entity must provide a disabled individual with reasonable
accommodation to assist the individual in becoming "qualified. ' 40 How-
ever, there: is no requirement for a covered entity to provide reasonable
accommodation if to do so would cause undue hardship.4'
Congress chose not to include particular requirements within the Act.
Instead, Congress designated within each of the titles an agency respon-
sible for piromulgating regulations to implement the title.42 Congress also
the use of intimidation or coercion against a disabled individual exercising his or
her rights under the Act. See id. § 12203.
37. "Disability means, with respect to an individual, a physical or mental im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; a record of such an impairment; or being regarded as having such an
impairment." Id § 12102(2). Title V of the ADA generally provides that a "dis-
ability" does not include "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or
other sexual behavior disorders; compulsive gambling, kleptomania, or pyromania;
or psychoactive substance use disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs."
See id § 1221 1(b). In addition, homosexuality and bisexuality are not considered
disabilities. See id § 12211(a).
38. See id §§ 12112, 12132. Title I defines a "qualified individual with a
disability" zs: "lAin individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position
that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8). Title II defines a "qualified
individual with a disability" as "an individual with a disability who, with or with-
out reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of archi-
tectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of
services or the participation in programs or activities." Id. § 12131(2).
39. See id § 12182(a).
40. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o) (1998) (Title I); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)
(1998) (Title II).
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (1994) (Title I); 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)
(1998) (Title II).
42. Congress designated the EEOC responsible for promulgating regulations
implementhig Title I of the Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12111(1). The DOJ has
the responsibility of implementing regulations under Title 11, Subtitle A. See id
§ 12134(a). Under Title II, Subtitle B, Title III and Title IV, the Secretary of
Transportation issues regulations implementing the titles. See id. §§ 12143, 12164
1998]
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stated that the ADA must be applied consistently with the Rehabilitation
Act.
43
A defendant charged with violating the ADA may raise several de-
fenses. The defendant may produce evidence to rebut any of the prima
facie elements of the plaintiff's case. 44 For example, the defendant may
produce evidence that the plaintiff does not have a disability as defined
under the ADA, or that the defendant had a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for taking the action in question. In addition, the defendant
may offer evidence that no reasonable alternative existed to accommo-
date the individual's disability, and that without accommodation, the
individual is not "qualified." Further, the entity may demonstrate that
reasonable accommodation would have placed an "undue burden" on the
defendant.
III. APPLICATION OF THE ADA TO STATE PRISONS
AND PRISONERS
A. Title II and Disabled Prisoners
A disabled prisoner may allege a violation of any title of the ADA.4 s
However, the majority of litigation brought by prisoners has been based
on Title II since the title is directed at prohibiting discrimination by state
and local government entities. To facilitate an understanding of the Cir-
cuit Courts' disagreement regarding Title 1I's coverage of state prison-
ers, it is important to understand: (1) what Congress was attempting to
accomplish by enacting the ADA, and how Title II fits into that overall
purpose; (2) the statutory language utilized in Title II; (3) the regula-
tions promulgated to implement the ADA and the deference afforded to
the administrative regulations; and (4) the relationship between Title II
and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
B. Statutory Language of Title 1I
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, it was not uncommon for a state to
(authorizing regulations under Title II, Subtitle B), 12186(a)(1) (authorizing regu-
lations under Title III), 225(d) (authorizing regulations under Title IV).
43. See id. § 1220 1(a).
44. This is true of legal claims generally where the plaintiff has the burden
of persuasion as to the elements of the case.
45. For examples of how a disabled prisoner might bring a lawsuit under a
provision of the ADA other than Title II, see Gardner, supra note 1, at 176-78.
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deny disabled individuals access to non-federally funded public services
because of the individual's disability.46 Congress realized the ADA's
goals of self-sufficiency and mainstreaming were less likely to be
achieved without mandating access to these services. Therefore, Con-
gress enacted Title II of the ADA to extend the Act's general prohibition
against disability discrimination to state and local government.
Title II states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by
reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjectcd to discrimination by any such entity."47 An individual al-
leging a violation of Title II has the prima facie burden of establishing
that he or she (1) is a qualified individual, (2) has a disability, and (3)
was subjected to prohibited discrimination by a public entity.4
Title II defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as "an indi-
vidual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to
rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential eligibility require-
ments for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or ac-
tivities."49 A "public entity" includes "(A) any State or local government
* . . (B) any department, agency, special purpose district, or other in-
strumentality of a State or States or local government."50 There is no
further definition of a "qualified individual" or "public entity," and no
express language including or exempting state correctional facilities or
prisoners fi'om the purview of the Act. In addition, the legislative history
of the ADA is silent with regard to its application to state prisons or
prisoners.
C. Department of Justice Regulations
Congress authorized the DOJ to promulgate regulations implementing
Title II of the ADA.5' As with other administrative regulations, the gen-
eral rule is that regulations "should be accorded controlling weight un-
less [they are] 'arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute.' 52 The preambles to any regulations are afforded the same defer-
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3).
47. Ia' § 12132.
48. Sc:e Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447,455 (9th Cir. 1996).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).
50. 16d § 1213 1(1).
51. See id. §§ 12134(a), 12206.
52. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
1998]
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ence.53 The DOJ regulations clearly apply to state correctional facilities.
The preamble and the regulations themselves contain at least two refer-
ences to state prisons. The first reference states that the DOJ is the
agency responsible for enforcing the ADA as it applies to "the admini-
stration of justice, including .. correctional institutions . . . ."" The
second reference is that "[a] public entity is not.., required to provide
attendant care, or assistance in toileting, eating, or dressing to individu-
als with disabilities, except.., where the individual is an inmate of a
custodial or correctional institution." 55 Therefore, the DOJ construes its
authority to include promulgating regulations that apply to state prisons.
D. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
It was Congress' intent in enacting the ADA to expand the federal
disability discrimination law to entities not covered by the Rehabilita-
tion Act; namely, to entities not receiving federal funding. Congress
directed that the ADA be applied consistently with the Rehabilitation
Act. 56 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act states that "[n]o otherwise
qualified individual with a disability.., shall, solely by reason of her or
his disability, be excluded from the participation in, or be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or ac-
tivity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " Because many state
515 U.S. 687 (1995).
53. The preamble is considered part of an agency's interpretation of the
statute.
54. 28 C.F.R. § 35.190(b)(6) (1997).
55. Id. pt. 35, app. A, at 478.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 1220 1(a) (1994).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (1994). According to the United States Supreme
Court, section 504 requires that programs receiving federal funding make reason-
able accommodations to ensure that otherwise qualified individuals with a disabil-
ity may have "meaningful access" to the programs. See Alexander v. Choate, 469
U.S. 287, 301 (1985). A plaintiff alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation Act
must demonstrate in a prima facie case that he or she (1) is handicapped, (2) is
otherwise qualified, (3) the program in dispute receives federal funds, and (4) the
discrimination alleged is on the basis of his or her handicap. See Greater Los An-
geles Council on Deafness v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1987). The
scope of Title II is broader than the Rehabilitation Act and, as a result, an individ-
ual bringing suit under the ADA generally has a less stringent burden because there
is no requirement to prove receipt of federal funding in his or her primafacie case.
However, in the context of state prisons, proof that the prison receives federal
funds is not a difficult burden to meet, and therefore, many disabled prisoners al-
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and local government entities receive federal funding, Section 504 is
"materially identical"58 to the provisions of Title II. Therefore, Section
504 serves as the model for determining how to read Title 11.59 As in the
ADA, there is no specific statutory reference in Section 504 or in the
legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act to state prisons or prisoners.
However, the regulations promulgated by the DOJ set forth in Section
504 apply to correctional facilities.60 The regulations define the term
"program" as "the operations of the agency or organizational unit of
government receiving or substantially benefiting from the Federal as-
sistance awarded, e.g., a police department or department of correc-
tions.",61 The definition of the term "benefit" includes "provision of
services, financial aid or disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision,
sentencing, confinement, or other prescription of conduct). 62
Prior to the enactment of the ADA, case law interpreting Section
504's application to state prisoners was limited. Only three United
States District Courts had addressed the issue.63 All three cases held that
Section 504 covered state prisons and their prisoners.
IV. THE DEBATE OVER APPLICATION OF TITLE II TO STATE
PRISONS AND PRISONERS
A. Federalism Concerns and the Question ofAmbiguity
1. Which rule of statutory construction applies?
Since the enactment of the ADA, several courts addressed whether
lege violations of both statutes.
58. Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 483, 483 (7th Cir.
1997).
59. Se id.
60. Congress authorized the DOJ to promulgate regulations implementing
Section 504. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
61. 2: C.F.R. § 42.540(h)(1996).
62. Id § 42.5400).
63. Se Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559, 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
disabled stae inmate may raise a claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act); Harris v. Thigpen, 727 F. Supp. 1564, 1582-83 (M.D. Ala. 1990), afid, 941
F.2d 1495, 1527 (11 th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that disabled inmates may have a
cause of action under the Rehabilitation Act); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp.
1190, 1197 (N.D. W. Va. 1976) (holding that a disabled state inmate may raise a
claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act).
1998]
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disabled prisoners have a cognizable cause of action under Title II of the
statute. Initially, courts circumvented this issue by disposing of claims
based on the defense of qualified immunity.64 Recently, however, courts
have been forced to definitively answer whether the Act applies.
In 1996 and 1997, five United States Courts of Appeals interpreted
the provisions of Title II to determine whether the provisions cover state
prisoners.6 s When interpreting a statute, a court generally looks to the
plain language of the statute to determine its application." The plain
language controls unless it is (1) ambiguous, or (2) frustrates the draft-
ers' intent.67 If ambiguous, a court will typically resort to extrinsic
sources for guidance on the interpretation of the statute. Two such
sources include legislative history and administrative regulations. How-
ever, if application of a statute would permit Congress to upset the tra-
ditional federal-state balance of power, the clear statement rule of
statutory construction68 applies to interpret the ambiguity.69 The rule
requires Congress to make its intention to regulate in such a manner
unmistakably clear in the text of the statute.70 Therefore, courts must
64. Government officials working in their representative capacities can raise
the defense of qualified immunity and have any claims against them dismissed
where they can demonstrate that "their actions could reasonably have been thought
consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated." Anderson v. Creigh-
ton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987).
65. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Services,
126 F.3d 589, 591 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA does not apply to state
correctional facilities); Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997)
(reaffirming its prior holding that the ADA does apply to state correctional facili-
ties); Yeskey v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 174 (3rd Cir.
1997) (holding that the ADA does provide a cause of action to disabled state pris-
oners); Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that the ADA does apply to state prisons); White v. Colorado, 82
F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the ADA does not apply to inmates in
state prisons).
66. See Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 409 (1993) ("The
starting point in interpreting a statute is its language, for 'if the intent is clear, that
is the end of the matter."') (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)).
67. See Kelley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 17 F.3d 836, 842 (6th Cir.
1994).
68. The rule is also referred to as the plain statement rule. See Pennsylvania
Dep't of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. 1952, 1954 (1998).
69. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,460-61 (1991).
70. See id.; Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985);
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interpret any ambiguity within the four corners of the statute as pre-
serving state control." The policy behind the rule is that it "assures that
the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the
critical matters involved in the judicial decision." 72
In interpreting Title II, the Circuit Courts determined whether the Ti-
tle unambiguously applies to inmates in state prisons. Because states
traditionally manage their prisons, applying the ADA to state prisons
frustrates Ihe federal-state balance of power.7 3 Thus, the difference in
opinions as to whether Title II is ambiguous depended upon the degree
of concern a court had about preserving federalism. Further, since the
courts disagreed on the ambiguity of Title II, they reached different con-
clusions regarding the application of the clear statement rule. It is there-
fore, important to understand what the clear statement rule is, and how it
has traditionally been applied.
2. The Clear Statement Rule
a. The 1980s
Clear statement rules are not new cannons of statutory construction. 4
They have been applied over the years in various contexts. However, the
federalism.-based canons have undergone significant changes over the
last two decades. First, in 1981, in Pennhurst State School and Hospital.
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981); Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
71. S:ee Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460-61.
72. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971). The Supreme Court
has also described the rationale as: "The plain statement rule is nothing more than
an acknowledgment that the States retain substantial sovereign powers under our
Constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily interfere."
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
73. ;ee Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491-92 (1973) (stating, "[I]t is
difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is
more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the
administration of its prisons.").
74. 3ee William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutibnal
Law: Clear S'tatement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv. 593,
598 (1992) ("[Many of the substantive cannons of statutory construction [includ-
ing the clear statement rules] are directly inspired by the Constitution . . ").
Authors Eskridge & Frickey provide an in-depth historical perspective on the use
of clear statement rules from 1975-1991.
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v. Halderman,7 the Supreme Court created a clear statement rule to ap-
ply in situations where it is unclear whether Congress intended to place
conditions on state acceptance of federal funds. 76 In Pennhurst, the Su-
preme Court recognized that "Congress may fix the terms on which it
shall disburse federal money to the States." 77 However, the Court analo-
gized legislation pursuant to the spending power to a contract. The fed-
eral government offers to disburse funds subject to certain conditions,
and the States, in accepting the moneys, agree to be bound by the condi-
tions.78 Viewing the transaction as a "contract," the Supreme Court re-
quired voluntary and knowing acceptance of the terms on the part of the
States.79 In order to ensure knowing acceptance, the Supreme Court pro-
nounced that "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."
80
Second, the 1980s marked a dramatic change in the nature of the clear
statement rule applied in Eleventh Amendment 1 immunity cases.82 Prior
to this time, any ambiguity regarding whether Congress intended to ab-
rogate the States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal
courts was interpreted using a presumption.8 3 It was presumed that Con-
gress did not intend to abrogate the States' immunity; however, this pre-
sumption could be overcome by looking to statutory language and leg-
islative history, among other things." This framework changed in Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon.85
In Atascadero, the Supreme Court addressed whether Congress in-
75. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
76. See id. at 17.
77. Id.
78. See id
79. See id
80. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. The issue is "whether Congress spoke so
clearly that [a court] can fairly say that the State could make an informed choice."
Id. at 24-25.
81. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citi-
zens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
82. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985)
(holding that the Rehabilitation Act does not abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity).
83. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at 621.
84. See id.
85. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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tended to override the States' immunity under the Rehabilitation Act.86
The Court acknowledged that Congress has the constitutional authority
to do so.8 7 Recognizing, however, that any abrogation frustrates the
Constitutional federal-state balance of power,88 the Court held that if
Congress intends to abrogate the States' immunity, it must make "its
intention utnmistakably clear in the language of the statute. 8 9 Thus, in
Atascadero, the Court began requiring a "clearer, more explicit state-
ment from Congress in the text of the statute, without reference to leg-
islative hi;tory, than prior clear statement rules have required." 90 The
Supreme Court continues to require a stronger statement of intent in the
text of a statute in Eleventh Amendment cases. 91
This change occurred largely in response to the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,92 over-
ruling its earlier decision in National League of Cities v. Usery. 9' In
National League of Cities, the Supreme Court recognized that Congress
may not regulate certain State activities under the Commerce Clause.94
The Court set forth several conditions that must be met in order to de-
termine when States are immune from regulation. 95 One condition was
that Congress attempt to enforce legislation against a State in "areas of
traditional governmental functions." 9 After the National League of Cit-
ies decision, courts had a difficult time applying the "traditional gov-
ernmental functions" test as it was unclear which State functions were
"traditional. 97
In Garcia, the Court recognized the fact that the test had proven to be
unworkable and concluded that the test was also contrary to notions of
86. Se id at 247.
87. S&e id at 242.
88. Se id; see also Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 547 (1985).
89. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
90. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at 622.
91. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492
U.S. 96 (19119). Authors Eskridge & Frickey also point out that a similarly strong
clear statement rule has been applied to issues of whether States have waived their
Constitutional immunity. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 74, at 622.
92. 469 U.S. 528, 530 (1985).
93. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
94. Se id. at 845, 854.
95. See id.
96. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530.
97. k.
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federalism. 98 According to the Court, "[s]tates occupy a special and spe-
cific position in our constitutional system and . . . the Scope of Con-
gress' authority under the Commerce Clause must reflect that
position." 99 Nevertheless, the political process, rather than traditional
Commerce Clause analysis, is the proper mechanism by which to accord
states due protection. 00 The Supreme Court described the protection
afforded by the political process as: "The principle and basic limit on
the federal commerce power is that inherent in all congressional action -
the built-in restraints that our system provides through state participa-
tion in federal governmental action. The political process ensures that
laws that unduly burden the States will not be promulgated." 0' Thus, in
the mid-1980s, the Supreme Court inoved away from applying tradi-
tional Commerce Clause analysis to guard against overreaching federal
regulation and toward deferring such decisions to the people, through
the political process. In the subsequent Eleventh Amendment immunity
and state waiver cases, the Supreme Court ensured that Congress in-
tended to frustrate the federal-state balance of power by requiring Con-
gress to include a clear statement of its intent in the text of a statute.102
b. The 1990s
In the early 1990s, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of the fed-
eralism-based clear statement rules in its decision of Gregory v. Ash-
croft.10 3 The Court applied a clear statement rule to determine the appli-
cation of a statute involving a core state function.' °4 Specifically, the
issue in Gregory was whether a provision of the Missouri Constitution,
98. See id at 531.
99. Id. at 556.
100. See id.
101. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556.
102. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991); Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985). This change has been charac-
terized as: "[J]udicial restraint at the constitutional level, [to] judicial activism at
the interpretive level." Eskridege & Frickey, supra note 74, at 623.
103. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
104. Congress expressly extended the ADEA to the states in 1974 and
therefore, there was no question that States could be sued under the Act. See 29
U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1994). According to Justice White's dissent in Gregory, the
only dispute in the case was "over the precise details of the [ADEA's] application.
We have never extended the plain statement approach that far, and the majority
offers no compelling reason for doing so." Gregory, 501 U.S. at 476.
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which provided a mandatory retirement age of seventy for most state
judges,10 5 violated the federal ADEA.'n6
The Court began its analysis with a lengthy discussion of the func-
tioning of the dual system of government, and the importance of main-
taining the integrity of the system.0 7 The Court noted that the power of
the federal government is constrained. 0 8 Specifically, the federal gov-
ernment's power is limited by the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution,
which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."' 09 Therefore, if the federal government
wishes to act, it must find the authority to do so within the
Constitution." 0 However, the Supreme Court, quoting James Madison,
noted that "[tihe powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
federal government are few and defined. Those. which are to remain in
the State governments are numerous and indefinite."''
105. The Missouri Constitution provides that "all judges other than mu-
nicipal judges shall retire at the age of seventy years." MO. CONST. art. V, § 26.
106. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634. The other issue in Gregory was whether
the Missouzi constitutional provision violated the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 456. For purposes of this Comment,
the only relcvant query is whether the Missouri Constitution violated the ADEA.
107. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. The Court's description of the dual
system of government is:
'The people of each State compose a State, having its own gov-
ernment, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate
and jindependent existence,'.. 'Without the States in union, there
could be no such politicaf body as the United States.' Not only,
therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent auton-
omy to the States, through their union under the Constitution, but
it may be not reasonably said that the preservation of the States,
and the maintenance of their governments, are as much within the
design and care of the Constitution as the preservation of the Un-
ion and the maintenance of the National government. The Con-
stitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.
Id (citations omitted).
108. See id
109. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
110. The Court in Gregory did not have to decide whether Congress had
the constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause to apply the ADEA to state
appointed judges because the requirements of the clear 9tatement rule were not met.
See Gregory 501 U.S. at 464. Thus, applying the rule in certain instances will
avoid constitutional problems.
111. Id. at 458 (citing The Federalist No. 45, at 292-93 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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In this balance of powers, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the
Supremacy Clause affords the federal government an advantage over the
states.' 2 Where the federal government acts pursuant to its authority
under the Constitution, its actions are supreme to any state action. Thus,
the federal government may even regulate areas traditionally reserved to
the states.113 However, the Court pointed out several advantages of our
dual sovereigns system of government." 4 According to the Court, the
most important advantage of the dual powers is that our system serves as
a check on potential abuses of power." 5 Therefore, the Court stated that
Congress' ability to impose its wishes on the states is "an extraordinary
power in a federalist system. It is a power that we must assume Con-
gress does not exercise lightly.""
6
The Court went on to state that the Missouri provision establishing a
qualification for its judges "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated
by the States; it is a decision of the most fundamental sort for a sover-
eign entity. Through the structure of its government, and the character of
those who exercise government authority, a State defines itself as a sov-
ereign.,"' 7 The Court analogized the situation presented in Gregory to a
line of Supreme Court cases dealing with the degree to which the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment restricts a state from
prohibiting aliens from gaining public employment." 8 In these cases, the
Court held that decisions that "go to the heart of representative govern-
ment" are unique in nature, and while the Equal Protection Clause poses
a check on -state power to exclude aliens from service, the standard of
112. See id. at 458.
113. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
114. Id. at 458. The Court articulated the following benefits:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that
will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogenous soci-
ety; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic
processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in
tgovernment; and it makes government more responsive by putting
e States in competition f6r a mobile citizenry.
Id. For a greater discussion on the advantages of our dual system of government
see generally Merrit, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a
Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 3-10 (1988).
115. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
116. Id at 460.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 461.
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reviewing exclusions will be lowered because of this unique function."19
According to the Gregory Court, "[these cases stand in recognition of
the authority of the people of the States to determine the qualifications
of their most important government officials. It is an authority that lies
at 'the heart of representative government.' It is a power reserved to the
States under the Tenth Amendment... ,,"20
Nevertheless, the Gregory Court acknowledged that the people's
rights to determine the qualifications of their government officials is
limited, and Congress may have authority to regulate in this area.' 2 1 Yet,
because of the Garcia decision, the Court stated that it was "constrained
in [its] abi~lity to consider the limits that the state-federal balance places
on Congress' powers under the Commerce Clause."'22 Instead, the Court
applied the clear statement rule to ensure that Congress intended to ap-
ply the ADEA to state appointed judges. 23
The ADEA prohibits an employer from terminating "any individual"
from service who is at least forty years of age "because of such individ-
ual's age."' 24 An "employer" includes "a State or local political subdivi-
sion of a State .. . ."125 The term "employee" is defined as "an individ-
ual employed by any employer except that the term 'employee' shall not
include.., an appointee on the policy making level." 26
The Court concluded that the statute was ambiguous in its application
to appointed state judges because it was unclear whether appointed
judges fell within the "appointee on the policy making level" exception
of the statute. 27 The Court stated that the exception was broad enough
that the Court could not conclude that Congress intended state appointed
119. See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 648 (1973). In this case, the
Court stated that "our scrutiny will not be so demanding where we deal with mat-
ters resting firmly within a State's constitutional prerogatives." Id This "political
function" exception was expanded to positions which are "intimately related to the
process of democratic self-government." Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220
(1984).
120. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 463.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 464.
123. See id.
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 63 ](a) (1995).
125. Id § 630(b)(2). Prior to the 1974 ADEA amendment, states were not
considered employers subject to the Act. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
126. 29 U.S.C. § 630(0. This exception followed the inclusion of a state
within the definition of employer. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464.
127. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 467.
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judges to be covered by the ADEA. The Court applied the clear state-
ment rule to interpret the ambiguity and held that the ADEA does not
apply to state appointed judges.128 The Court also mentioned that the Act
did not need to list judges explicitly in order to include them. 129
B. The Statutory Language of Title I
1. Does the Definition of "Public Entity" Create Ambiguity?
The Gregory decision left two primary issues unresolved: First, which
state functions trigger the application of the clear statement rule; second,
what is the level of clarity Congress must have in order to rebut the pre-
sumption of non-interference? Both, of these issues arose in the debate
among the Circuit Courts when considering whether the ADA applies to
inmates in state prisons. Each of the courts accepted that the manage-
ment of state prisons is a core state function. 30 Rather, the debate fo-
cused on whether the language in Title II is ambiguous.
The Gregory decision provides an example of the application of the
clear statement rule to ambiguous statutory language. Gregory also es-
tablishes that there is no requirement for Congress to list each state
agency covered in a statute or each activity Congress intends to regulate
in order to preempt state statutes.' 3 ' Thus, the line between clarity and
128. See id.
129. See id.
130. The courts did not question whether the administration of state pris-
ons is a core state function. It is unclear after Gregory whether the function is a
core state function triggering the application of the clear statement rule. The Su-
preme Court phrased the clear statement rule in Gregory in broad terms. See id. at
460-61. The rule requires Congress to make its intentions to frustrate the federal-
state balance of power unmistakably clear in the text of the statute. See id With
such a broad rule, it is quite possible that the clear statement rule governs all issues
involving essential state functions. Nevertheless, in Gregory, the Court was faced
with determining the qualifications of public officials, which "go[es] to the heart of
representative government." Id at 461. Specifically, the Court stated that the func-
tion "goes beyond an area traditionally regulated by the States; it is a decision of
the most fundamental sort for a sovereign entity." Id at 460. This may suggest
that the Supreme Court is more concerned with preserving state control over issues
of representative government. Unfortunately, however, with only one Supreme
Court case providing guidance on this issue, it is difficult to definitively determine
which core state functions warrant use of the rule.
131. See id. at 467.
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ambiguity is somewhere between listing each entity, and providing a
general definition with a broad exception, as in Gregory. The Circuit
Courts that interpreted Title II had to determine where the Title's statu-
tory language falls within that spectrum.
Title II covers "public entities" which is broadly defined to include
"any" state government or instrumentality thereof 3 Furthermore, Title
II does not contain any exceptions to the term "public entity" that would
exclude certain state agencies from the purview of the statute. Because
the definition of a "public entity" is broad, the question arose concern-
ing whether broad statutory language is ambiguous.
The Thi:rd, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits concluded that the broad defi-
nition of a "public entity" unambiguously expresses congressional intent
to cover all state and local government agencies, including state
prisons. 33 These courts focused on the use of the word "any" in relation
to state government entities and the lack of any modifier that would ex-
clude certain state entities from coverage. In addition, the Ninth Circuit
and the dis;sent in Amos distinguished the language of Title II from that
of the ADEA and concluded that the clear statement rule does not
apply.' 34 However, the Fourth Circuit in Amos concluded that the
breadth of the ADA renders it ambiguous in relation to state prisons and
prisoners.Is In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the statu-
tory language of the ADA and the ADEA, and found them to be indis-
tinguishable. 36 Thus, the argument was whether the language in the
ADA was comparable to the language in the ADEA, which the Supreme
Court determined to be ambiguous.
In Gregory, the Court was interpreting a statute containing a broad
exception. Conversely, the courts interpreting Title II were confronted
with a broad statutory provision with no exceptions. In other words, the
ADEA contains a broad exception, while Title II is a broad statute.
137
132. See supra Part III, subsection B for the definition of a "public entity."
133. Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019, 1023 (9th Cir. 1997); Yeskey v.
Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3rd Cir. 1997); Crawford v.
Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481,485 (7th Cir. 1997).
134. See Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1024.
135. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Servs.,
126 F.3d 589, 605 (4th Cir. 1997).
136. See id
137. The Ninth Circuit noted the following difference: "In contrast to the
ADEA, which expressly excludes most high-ranking public officials from its reach,
the ADA ... appl[ies] to 'any' and 'all' state entities and operations without exclu-
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This is a significant difference. In the case of a broad exception, as in
the ADEA, it is clear, at the outset, that Congress does not intend the
statute to apply to all individuals because it included the exception. If
the exception is broad, there will likely be confusion regarding the cov-
erage of certain entities by the statute, possibly rendering the statute
ambiguous.
On the other hand, a broad statute, particularly one that covers "any"
particular class of entities or individuals without exception, can be dis-
tinguished from a statute such as the ADEA. With a broad statute, a
court interprets the statute to comport with Congresses intention for it to
apply to all entities.138 Further, the language in Title II is very similar to
the broad definition of "employer" used in the ADEA. In Gregory, the
Supreme Court stated that "[w]here it is unambiguous that an employee
does not fall within one of the exceptions, the Act states plainly and
unequivocally that the employee is included.', 39 The Act defines an
"employer" to include "a State or political subdivision of a State ..."140
Thus, the Court said that if an employee did not fall within one of the
exceptions, a public employer must adhere to the statute. Therefore, the
broad definition of an "employer" is not ambiguous. If there had been no
exception to the definition, the clear statement rule would not have ap-
plied because the rule is only applicable when there is ambiguous lan-
guage. Thus, the definition of "public entity" seemed to unequivocally
include state prisons.
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit's argument that the language in Title
II is indistinguishable from the ambiguous language in the ADEA leaves
Congress with no alternative but to list each entity to which a statute
applied. It is difficult to imagine statutory language that would be less
ambiguous than including the word "any," yet would not entail explic-
itly referring to state prisons in the Act. Congress might have been com-
pelled to specifically list each entity to which a statute applies because
sions." Armstrong, 124 F.3d at 1024 (citation omitted).
138. See id. In fact, the argument becomes stronger when one considers
that Congress intentionally drafted the ADA to cover state action. Furthermore,
Congress knew that core state functions would be regulated, yet it chose not to
exclude them. See id. In addition, when one considers that Congress delegated the
DOJ, an agency concerned with criminal justice, as the agency responsible for
implementing Title II, this further lends support to the argument. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12134(a) (1994).
139. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991).
140. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)(2) (1995).
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the court in Amos did not provide any examples of satisfactory language.
An enumeration requirement wastes legislative resources and is at odds
with the Gregory decision.141 The Supreme Court's decision in Yeskey
remedied -this problem.
The Fourth Circuit also raised the point that the term "public entity"
itself crealtes ambiguity as to whether state prisons are required to adhere
to the ADA. According to the court, the word "public" is fundamentally
at odds with a state prison because a prison does not provide services to
the public.' 42 In fact, prisons exclude the public except under limited
circumstances.1 43 However, detaining criminals from society and at-
tempting to rehabilitate them for their future return to society is a serv-
ice provided to the public. In addition, if the term "public" was intended
to exclude prisons, Title II would not protect disabled prison visitors,
personnel, or attorneys. Such an application of Title II is absurd.
2. Dos the Plain Meaning of the Term "Qualified Individual"
Create Ambiguity?
In Amo.,, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the definition of a "quali-
fied individual" creates ambiguity regarding whether Title II applies to
inmates in State prisons. 144 The definition necessarily requires that
"services," "programs," or "activities" be provided by the public entity.
However, the court determined that a prison does not provide "services,"
"programs," or "activities" to its inmates because incarceration is not a
"service," "program," or "activity."' 145
The Fourth Circuit also determined that the terms "eligible" and "par-
141. See id.
142. See Amos v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety and Correctional Serv-
ices, 126 F.3d 589, 596 (4th Cir. 1997). The court stated that "the name ascribed to
Title II - 'Public Services' -- connotes a ban on discrimination in services provided
to the publi:, not in the prison context where the public is excluded. State prisons
thus do not fit neatly within the definition of 'public entities' to which the ADA
applies." Id (citation omitted).
143. Examples of public access to prisons include visitors during estab-
lished visiting hours and prison personnel.
144. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 596.
145. See id. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the definition of a
"qualified individual" in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act creates ambiguity.
See, e.g., White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1996); Williams v.
Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The... Rehabilitation Act... does
not give plaintiff any substantive rights since the Federal Bureau of Prisons does
not fit the dcfinition of 'programs or activities'....").
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ticipate" in the definition of a "qualified individual" create ambiguity
because the words connote voluntary participation in, or receipt of, pub-
lic services, programs or activities. The court concluded that prisoners
do not voluntarily receive benefits. 46 In fact, the word "voluntary" is at
odds with the nature of prisons.
47
Although it seems ridiculous to think of incarceration as a "service,"
"program," or "activity" provided to prisoners, state prisons do provide
certain services, programs, and activities as these terms are commonly
understood.148 For example, prisons often provide substance abuse pro-
grams, vocational training, medical services, and access to a prison li-
brary. Further, Title II contains no exceptions for certain services, pro-
grams, or activities that would justify treating those provided in prisons
differently.
In addition, implying the condition of voluntariness from the terms
"eligible" or "participate" is inconsistent with the text and purpose of
the ADA. 49 The findings section of the ADA states that "discrimination
against individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as...
institutionalization."' 150 Certainly, by definition, institutionalized indi-
viduals are not free, and many of their decisions are not made voluntar-
ily. Congress, however, did not intend that such individuals be excluded
from being considered qualified individuals by virtue of their lack of
freedom. In addition, implying an element of voluntariness has the ef-
fect of excluding other state services, programs, and activities that are
mandatory, such as public education."' Therefore, a disabled child at-
146. See Amos, 126 F.3d at 596.
147. See id.
148. According to the Seventh Circuit, "[While] [i]ncarceration itself is
hardly a 'program' or activity' to which a disabled person might wish access ....
there is no doubt that an educational program is a program, and when it is provided
by and in a state prison it is a program of a public entity." Crawford v. Indiana
Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
149. See Yeskey v. Pennsylvania. Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 173
(3rd Cir. 1997). In addition, the Third Circuit concluded that implying voluntari-
ness from the terms is inconsistent with their plain meanings. The court stated that
"[t]he terms 'eligibility' and 'participation' do not.. . imply voluntariness or man-
date that an individual seek out or request a service to be covered. To the contrary,
the term 'eligibility' simply describes those who are 'fitted or qualified to be cho-
sen,' without regard to their own wishes." Id. (citation omitted) (quoting
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 736 (1986)).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1995).
151. See Armstrong v. Wilson, 124 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 1997).
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tending a public school would have no recourse under Title II of the
ADA if the student were denied participation in a school activity based
on his or her disability, because the student would not be considered a
qualified individual. This result is not only absurd but is inconsistent
with case law in certain jurisdictions.
V. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS V.
YESKEY: THE ADA APPLIES TO INMATES IN STATE PRISONS
On June 15, 1998, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of
Pennsylvamia Department of Corrections v. Yeskey. 52 The unanimous
Court ruled that the statutory language of Title II unmistakably covers
inmates in state prisons. 53 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia con-
cluded that it was unnecessary to decide whether the clear statement rule
governed the analysis. 5 4 Assuming arguendo that the rule applies, the
Court decided that the rule is "amply met."
The Court distinguished the broad language of Title II, specifically,
the expansive definition of a "public entity," from the language of the
ADEA interpreted in Gregory.155 According to the Court, the clear
statement rule was not met in Gregory because the Court could not say,
with certainty, that appointed state judges did not fall within the
ADEA's exception for an "appointee on the policy making level." In
other words, there was ambiguity regarding the coverage of employees
under the policy making exception. However, the Court concluded that
there was no ambiguity regarding whether Title II covers State prisons
and prisoners because "State prisons fall squarely within the statutory
definition of 'public entity." ' 156 In addition, Title II does not contain any
exception for certain state entities that would lead the Court to question
whether State prisons fell within the exception.
152. 118 S. Ct. 1952 (1998).
153. See id. at 1956.
154. See id. at 1954.
155. See id The Court stated the distinction between the cases as:
They situation here is not comparable to that in Gregory. There
although the ADEA plainly covered state employees, it contained
an exception for 'appointee[s] on the policy making level' which
made it impossible for us to 'conclude that the statute plainly
coverfed] appointed state judges.' Here, the ADA plainly covers
state institutions without any exception that could cast the cover-
age of prisons into doubt.
Id. (footnote omitted).
156. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1954.
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The Court also concluded that the definition of a "qualified individual
with a disability" does not create ambiguity as to whether the ADA ap-
plies to prisoners. 5 7 First, the terms "services," "programs," or "activi-
ties" do not create ambiguity because "[m]odern prisons provide inmates
with many recreational 'activities,' medical 'services,' and educational
and vocational 'programs' .... ,,158 In addition, there is nothing in the
statute itself that justifies distinguishing the programs and activities pro-
vided in prisons from those provided by other state entities.159 Second,
the terms "eligibility" and "participation" do not create ambiguity be-
cause the words do not imply voluntariness. 60 However, assuming ar-
guendo that the words connote voluntary participation, the Court noted
that prisons offer voluntary activities and programs, such as the use of a
prison library.1
6
'
Furthermore, the Court questioned the petitioners' argument that the
lack of reference to prisons in the statute's findings section creates am-
biguity because the section refers to institutionalization. 62 Additionally,
assuming that the findings do not refer to prisons, the Court still found
the argument unpersuasive. According to the Court, "the fact that a stat-
ute can be 'applied in situations not expressly anticipated by Congress
does not demonstrate ambiguity. It demonstrates breadth."",163
157. See id at 1955.
158. Id.
159. See id.
160. See id. The Court points out that Webster's New International Dic-
tionary defines "eligible" as "[flitted or qualified to be chosen or elected; legally or
morally suitable; as, an eligible candidate" hnd "participate" as "[t]o have a share in
common with others; to partake; share, as in a debate." Id. The Court provides the
following example of how one might be eligible to participate in an involuntary
program:
While "eligible" individuals "participate" voluntarily in many
programs services and activities, there are others for which they
are 'eligible" in which participation is mandatory. A drug addict
convicted of drug possession, for example might, as part of his
sentence be required to "participate" in a drug treatment program
for which only addicts are "eligible."
Id. (citation omitted).
161. See Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. at 1955. In fact, the Court emphasized that
participation in the Boot Camp program at issue in Yeskey was voluntary. See id.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (1994).
163. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
473 U.S. 479,499 (1985)).
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VI. COMMENT
The Gregory decision provides an example of the clear statement pre-
sumption operating to interpret ambiguous statutory language. Addition-
ally, the decision reinforces that Congress has the ability to preempt
certain slate actions, even those traditionally within the state sphere.
Congress need only have the constitutional authority to do so and make
its intentions clear in the text of a statute. The decision does not, how-
ever, resolve the critical question of the level of clarity required in fed-
eral statutory language to preempt state action.
Gregory left the Circuit Courts to resolve whether the ADA applies to
state prisoners without clear guidelines, or examples, of what constitutes
clear language. The courts, in turn, made decisions based on their con-
cern for preserving federalism. Thus, the debate appeared to center on
political issues, rather than on whether Congress intended the ADA to
apply to state prisons.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court's decision in Yeskey provides an ex-
ample of unambiguous statutory language that permits Congress to
regulate a. core state function. Courts presented with interpreting federal
statutes now have an example of both ambiguous and unambiguous
statutory language. Thus, in the future, there may be greater consistency
in the law because courts have less discretion to allow federalism con-
cerns to g;uide their decisions. Nevertheless, because the Supreme Court
held that -the clear statement rule is amply met, the decision leaves room
for debate. It is possible that a situation may arise in which the rule
would be met, but less convincingly. In that situation, the courts are
likely to be split regarding the clarity required of Congress to regulate
an essential state function. The impetus of the disagreement would be a
court's opinion concerning the role of the federal government in our
two-tier system of government. However, the decision provides an ex-
ample of the type of statutory language that, if subject to the clear
statement rule, would be sufficiently clear to allow Congress to preempt
state regulation under the Supremacy Clause. After the Yeskey decision,
a court confronting comparable statutory language would be hard
pressed to find such language ambiguous.
The Yeskey decision also reinforces the fact that there is no require-
ment for Congress to list each entity to which a statute applies in order
to meet the demands of the clear statement rule. While the issue was
resolved 'in Gregory, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Amos left many
questioning what Congress could have done to clearly express its inten-
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tion to apply the ADA in state prisons. Perhaps there was no way to sat-
isfy the court other than an express statement from Congress that state
prisons were required to adhere to the ADA. If the Supreme Court had
agreed with the Fourth Circuit, Congress would be forced to enumerate
each entity covered under a statute. Requiring Congress to legislate in
such a way has many foreseeable negative consequences. First, it would
be a waste of legislative resources, both in terms of time, and money.
Second, there would be a distinct possibility that Congress could mis-
takenly fail to include an entity in the statute. In this case, Congress
would be forced to either amend the statute, which further depletes Con-
gress' resources, or decide to forego amending the statute, which would
harm a group of individuals that do not have the political power to lobby
for amending the statute. 64 Thus, the Supreme Court's decision that the
language in Title II unmistakably applies to state prisons and prisoners
furthers several policies. These policies include the containment of leg-
islative costs; the assurance that individuals intended to benefit from a
statute are not unintentionally excluded; and the ability of Congress to
exercise its constitutional authority to preempt certain state functions
without unnecessary constraints.
By assuming, without deciding, the issue of whether the clear state-
ment rule governs the analysis, the Yeskey decision does not offer much
guidance on which state functions trigger use of the rule. It may be that
the clear statement rule only applies to state functions involving repre-
sentative government, as in Gregory. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court in Gregory may not have intended such a limited scope of the
rule. Perhaps, the Court simply pointed out the importance of state inter-
est in determining the qualifications of its judges.
It is foreseeable that this issue could resurface in two situations. First,
a future decision may involve congressional regulation of state prisons
164. See Michael P. Lee, How Clear is "Clear"?: A Lenient Interpretation
of the Gregory v. Ashcroft Clear Statement Rule, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 255, 257-58,
260-61 (1998). The author puts forth the following argument:
Enumeration increases both legislative decision costs, because it is
costly for Congress to list the entire range of functions it intends to
regulate, and error costs, because Congress may err by neglecting
to include a function it intended to affect. In addition, while the
clear statement rule is intended to increase decision costs by forc-
ing congressional deliberation, these costs may lead to legislative
paralysis. If Congress knows that it must enumerate every state
function it wishes to regulate, it may be deterred from initiating
important legislative efforts.
Id. at 257-58.
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in the context of different legislation. Second, there are potentially many
essential state functions that Congress may attempt to regulate. In both
situations, a court might not be able to avoid determining which state
functions trigger the clear statement rule and which is analyzed under
traditional rules of statutory construction. Thus, it is important to ex-
amine both the Gregory and Yeskey decisions for any indication as to
when the rule applies.
Although the decisions in Gregory and Yeskey would not be disposi-
tive in either situation, they offer some guidance. If the Supreme Court
in Gregory had only intended the rule to apply in situations involving
functions "going to the heart of representative government,"' 165 it is
likely that the Court would have phrased the rule in those terms. Instead,
the Court chose to use very broad terms. As espoused in Gregory, the
rule applies when the federal-state balance of power would be frustrated.
The traditional constitutional balance of power is upset in many situa-
tions out;ide of those involving functions of representative government.
In addition, after the Court's decision in Garcia, the Court may rely
more heavily on the clear statement rule to protect the federal-state bal-
ance of power and the integrity of our dual sovereign system of govern-
ment. Thus, while the Supreme Court is going to defer Commerce
Clause issues to the political process, it also requires Congress to speak
clearly if it intends to regulate core state functions. If the Supreme Court
applies the clear statement rule to more functions than those involving
representative government, the Court is better able to guard against un-
intended, potentially unconstitutional federal intrusions into the state
sphere and preserve our system of government.
This projection is supported by the Court's decision in Yeskey. Al-
though the Court does not state definitively that the rule would have
applied if the statutory language had been ambiguous, the Court does
suggest such a conclusion. The Court does so by pointing out the im-
portance of the preservation of societal order and the state interest in the
maintenance of its prisons. According to the Court: "One of the primary
functions of government.., is the preservation of societal order through
enforcement of criminal law, and the maintenance of penal institutions
is an essential part of that task."' 66
Despite. the Supreme Court's ruling, there is still some question as to
the practical effect of the decision. First, the petitioners in Yeskey raised
165. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
166. Yeskey, 118 S. Ct. at 1954.
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the argument that Congress exceeded the scope of its power under both
the Commerce Clause and Section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.
167
The Court did not address these issues because the petitioners did not
raise them in the lower courts. A future defendant may properly raise the
issue, thus leaving a court to decide it at a later date. 68
This may not be a concern to some. However, it is important to note
that this is not an issue of whether prisoners ought to be provided with
services or programs. As a society, and as taxpayers funding these pro-
grams, we may decide that there is no justification for providing prison
programs. However, once a decision has been made to offer such activi-
ties and programs, the intention of Congress to apply the ADA even to
criminals is clear. One could not legitimize a decision.to treat prisoners
differently solely on the basis of their disability, any more than one
could rationalize treating prisoners of different races or genders dispar-
ately.
The second issue that may resurface is how the ADA will be applied
in the prison setting. For example, Judge Posner, writing for the major-
ity in Crawford, raised the issue that the possible defenses that no rea-
sonable accommodation exists, or that the accommodation poses an un-
due burden, will be less stringent to meet in a prison. 169 He stated that
"[t]erms like 'reasonable' and 'undue' are relative to circumstances, and
the circumstances of a prison are different from those of a school, an
office, or a factory." 70 In fact, the Supreme Court made a similar con-
clusion in relation to a prisoner's liberty interest in marriage in Turner v.
Safley. 171 In Turner, the Court set forth a four-part reasonableness test
that weighed a prisoner's liberty interest in marriage against the prison's
interests in prison management. 72 The factors the Court considered gave
deference to the strong interests that a prison has in security. Therefore,
the Court acknowledged that reasonableness may depend on the circum-
stances, and that the scope of prisoners' rights may be diminished while
167. See id at 1956.
168. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently
concluded that Congress had the constitutional authority to enact the ADA. See
Alsbrook v. City of Maumelle, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 22112, at *12 (8th Cir.
1998).
169. See Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 115 F.3d 481, 487
(7th Cir. 1997).
170. Id.
171. 482 U.S. 78, 84-91 (1987).
172. See id.
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they are incarcerated. Because the same interests are present in the ap-
plication of the ADA to prisons, it is possible that a similar conclusion
may be reached. However, this issue remains undecided.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision in Yeskey affords disabled inmates in state pris-
ons protection against disability discrimination under the ADA. State
prisons will no longer be permitted to discriminate against their prison-
ers on the basis of disability. The decision also clarifies the scope of the
clear statement rule of statutory construction. It is clear after Yeskey
that a broad federal statute, containing no exceptions, is not ambiguous.
All Congress is required to do to legislate in a manner that frustrates the
federal-state balance of power is to enact broad legislation that clearly
covers a particular activity or class of entities. Such a requirement ap-
pears to strike a balance between preserving the states' traditional sov-
ereign powers and affording due deference to the Supremacy Clause.
Susan B. Hoppe
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